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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides an overview and experiments/simulations to verify improved efficiency and 
accuracy of social learning through so-called selfish learning that revises traditional social 
learning patterns (Raman and Pattabiraman, 2018).  We begin with introducing new concepts of 
social learning and the theoretical basis for utilizing selfish learning. Selfish learning is based on 
the concept that each agent will know decisions made by previous agents while receiving private 
signals. The agent can choose to declare and pass or declare and stop under the given 
information. There are two settings for selfish learning: 1) finite horizon, 2) infinite horizon. For 
finite horizon, we develop crowdsourcing experiments with a finite number of workers to test 
whether agents will respond according to reward maximization. The task is basically a ball game 
with different situations of varying combinations of private signal and public signal; workers 
give their choices in different situations. Additionally, we determine an appropriate experiment 
sample size by Monte Carlo simulation. For infinite horizons, we use reinforcement learning to 
simulate a Markov Decision Process formulation. We find that by informing decisions made by 
previous agents and receiving private signals, the accuracy of answers from crowdsourcing will 
be improved and the cost will be decreased.   
 
Keywords: social learning, selfish learning, crowdsourcing, Markov decision process, 
reinforcement learning 
  
iii 
 
Contents 
 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Motivation ........................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Mathematical theory .......................................................................................................................... 1 
2.Literature Review ....................................................................................................................................... 4 
3. Experimental design .................................................................................................................................. 6 
3.1 Main design of experiment ................................................................................................................. 6 
3.2 Mathematical theory of expected answer from workers ................................................................... 6 
3.3 Progress on Mturk implementation .................................................................................................... 8 
3.4 Sample size ........................................................................................................................................ 10 
3.4.1 Simulation to get sample size .................................................................................................... 10 
3.4.2 Results of simulations ................................................................................................................ 11 
4. Simulation of infinite horizon ................................................................................................................. 15 
4.1 Mathematical basis ........................................................................................................................... 15 
4.2 Realization of mathematical part ...................................................................................................... 15 
4.2.1 reinforcement learning with fixed number of states ................................................................. 15 
4.2.2 results of reinforcement learning (not as expected) ................................................................. 17 
4.2.3 Q-learning .................................................................................................................................. 19 
4.2.4 Results of Q-learning (expected) ............................................................................................... 19 
5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 27 
References .................................................................................................................................................. 29 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Crowdsourcing, which involves publishing a set of questions on platforms to let internet users 
answer, is an important approach in different research areas to collect data sets. To improve 
accuracy of crowdsourcing, social learning [3] has been introduced. 
 
In social learning, we hire a finite number of workers and let them make decisions in sequential 
order. Every worker can see the decisions made by previous workers. After all workers make 
decisions, we get the final worker’s decision as the final result. This basic model, in the long run, 
will appear to conform in that everyone will observe each other’s reactions and follow that 
reaction to be uniform. Therefore, when workers conform to a reaction, this reaction may be 
wrong [1].  
 
In order to reduce effects of conformism, a new approach was introduced. The difference 
between original concepts of social learning and what we do—named “selfish learning” [7]—is 
that each worker will be payed slightly less than the previous worker if the worker declares and 
chooses to stop, and all workers—that answered before will get the same amount as this worker 
(which means his answer is the final result and we do not need to find any other workers), but if 
the worker is incorrect, every worker that answers will not be paid. To sum up, as the number of 
workers that answer increases, the pay of each worker will be decreased. And each worker can 
choose to declare or not declare. If the answer is right, all workers get payment at the amount of 
that worker who stops. If the answer is incorrect, all previous workers including this worker will 
not get payment. This is what we call “selfish learning”. 
 
The basic idea of this thesis is to see whether effects of conformism decrease and whether there 
is a relation between decrease of payment for increasing number of workers with accuracy and 
less cost. There is already mathematical basis, so we need to use mathematical basis to see 
whether it can be applied practically.  
 
There are two parts to realize it: experiments and simulations. For experiments, what we think 
now is to assume a situation to let each worker answer that if they are in that situation, will they 
choose to stop and declare an answer, or choose to pass to the next worker to let next worker do 
decision. For simulation parts, we use reinforcement learning to simulate situations with infinite 
number of workers. 
 
1.2 Mathematical theory 
 
From concept of “selfish learning”, there are mathematical theories dealing with each worker’s 
decision and the reward function. Assume that for each worker, there is probability function H 
and noise Z with Gaussian distribution, where H is inference hypothesis {0,1} and Z ~ N (0,1). 
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So, the private signal of worker is Y = H + Z, and this worker will receive decision from earlier 
workers which is public signals. In other words, a worker will receive a private signal Y and a 
public signal which are decisions from the previous worker. 
 
By using a non-increasing variable g, for worker i, the reward function is based on number of 
workers and workers’ answers: 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛 1 {N = total number of workers answered this question, 
𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛= 𝐻𝐻∗, i < total number of workers}. Based on this function, 𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛 , the reward we give to each 
worker is the answer of last declared worker is correct, is non-increasing in n [7]. So, the longer 
the worker waits, the lesser the pay becomes. If the answer is incorrect, the payment will be 0.  
 
In selfish learning, the worker who makes the final decision is aiming to maximize the reward 
due to expected utility theory [6]. Thus, the workers try and maximize the utility given by 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 and 
have to decide between passing and waiting (in which case 𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛 decreases but probability of being 
correct becomes higher) and the choice of stopping and declaring (in which case the 𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛 may be 
large, but there is a greater chance of being wrong and not getting anything).  
 
There are three thresholds: 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛, 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛. When answering the question with two choices, workers 
can choose to stop and declare or pass to next worker and declare. Only when previous signals 
given to the current worker is strong, stopping and declaring will happen. So, for inference 
hypothesis {0,1} in margins of the scale between 0 to 1, there will be two part that fall in the 
situation that signal is strong: 𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 <  𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 >  𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛  where 𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 is the private signal for current 
worker. (when 𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 <  𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛, the current worker will tend to choose to stop and declare 𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛 =0, when 𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 >  𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛, the current worker will tend to choose to stop and declare 𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛 = 1. ) 
 
If the signal is not strong, the worker will choose to declare and pass to next worker: 
𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛∈(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛) which means private signal cannot give current worker strong support. But as for 
passing and declaring, there is also two situations: passing and declaring hypothesis H = 0 or 
passing and declaring hypothesis H = 1. Here is the third threshold 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 where 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 <  𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 < 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛. 
When the given signal for current worker falls between 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛, the worker will tend to 
choose to declare H = 0 and pass to next worker. When the given signal for current worker falls 
between 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 and  𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛, the worker will tend to choose to declare H = 1 and pass to next worker. 
By assuming each worker is selfish, there is a predicted phenomenon that worker will prefer to 
stop early due to non-increasing payment 𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛. 
 
Based on thresholds and private signal, given public signal as 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛: 
Decision of nth worker receiving private signal 𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛：  
𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛 = 1{𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 > 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛} 
Choose whether to stop or pass (𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 = 0 if choose to pass, 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 = 1 if choose to stop): 
𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 = 1{𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛∉(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛)} 
Posterior probability of nth worker’s hypothesis is 0: 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 = 𝑃𝑃[𝐻𝐻∗ = 0 |𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛−1, 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛−1 = 0]  
Where 𝐻𝐻∗ is given private signal and 𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛−1 is hypothesis from previous workers. 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛−1 = 0 
means the previous worker chose to pass to the current one. 
From Bayes rule, posterior becomes 𝑞𝑞
𝑛𝑛+1
1−𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+1
=  𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛
1−𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌∈(𝛼𝛼,𝛾𝛾)]
𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌∈(𝛼𝛼,𝛾𝛾)] 
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Based on theories in social learning system that nth worker use posterior 𝑞𝑞
𝑛𝑛+1
1−𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+1
= 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛
1−𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌∈(𝛼𝛼,𝛾𝛾)]
𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌∈(𝛼𝛼,𝛾𝛾)] to estimate, so  
𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 =  12 + log ( 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) 
Applying Bayes rule and posterior rule 
𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 = 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 − �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔 � 𝑅𝑅1(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 )1 − 𝑅𝑅0(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 )��+
𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 = 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 + �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔 � 𝑅𝑅0(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )1 − 𝑅𝑅1(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )��+ 
𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) =  𝐶𝐶(ℎ) +  𝜌𝜌𝑃𝑃ℎ[𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 ∈ (𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛, 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛)]𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 ) +  𝜌𝜌𝑃𝑃ℎ[𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 ∈ (𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛)]𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 ) where 𝜌𝜌 ∈(1
2
, 1) 
 
The formula is formula (11) from [7], and the induction process in included in [7]. As workers 
will try to maximize reward, the accuracy will be increased, and cost will be decreased partly due 
to non-increasing 𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛. 
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2.Literature Review 
 
2.1 Crowdsourcing 
 
Crowdsourcing now is a significant part of solving problems that are hard for computers to solve. 
On a crowdsourcing platform, organizations or individuals publish their needs to the platform 
and get results from separate internet users. After collecting answers from different agents, 
organizations or individuals publishing their needs will receive the cumulative answers. A 
central application is to collect data for machine learning. Data sets are important to develop 
machine learning theories, testing accuracy, and debug models. Hence crowdsourcing will be 
applied to a lot of aspects of machine learning. Additionally, crowdsourcing can also be applied 
to other fields. Researchers can conduct their researches on crowdsourcing platforms [10]. 
 
2.2 Social learning 
 
In order to increase accuracy of crowdsourcing, there is a model applied to collect data from 
crowdsourcing platforms. 
 
To deal with situations that there are two choices and it is necessary to choose one, hiring agents 
to choose one of them and let agents know information from other agents is a term called “social 
learning” [3]. Based on concept of social learning, there are some models being studied and 
used: contagion process model which idea is random matching, homogeneous populations model 
that agent must choose better one of two choices, heterogeneous populations model which main 
idea is individually optimal choice, and so on [5].  
 
2.3 Herding 
 
Social learning can increase accuracy of crowdsourcing. It has been applied to different fields 
and extensively studied. However, because social learning is based on concept that each agent 
will receive signals from other agents, there will be conformism happening, which, in other 
word, is called “herding”. Herding is a common phenomenon in our daily life and already studies 
in some papers such as [8]. When belief becomes too strong and private signal is boundedly 
informative, herding will occur. People will always follow prevalent choice to be uniform.  
Reference [8] conducts an experiment on mechanical turk. They assume that there are two 
baskets, each with 100 balls, and one basket with 70 blue balls and 30 red balls and one basket 
with 30 blue balls and 70 red balls. They only present one random chosen basket to seven 
participants and let them draw 9 balls and guess which basket it is. Participants cannot share 
information except the final answers they give. Thus, participants will know public signals (i.e. 
decisions from others) and will know their own private signals (i.e. colors of 9 balls). The results 
of this experiment show that people tend to use all information even when they should not do 
that. Reference [9] also shows that even when making decision from private signal is optimal, 
human agents will still tend to be affected by public signals. 
 
From public signals, the agent will prefer to follow most agents’ choice even though the private 
signal is different from public signals. With presence of herding, several agents choose incorrect 
answer will lead other agents to choose incorrect answer as well. The final results will also be 
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incorrect because further agents will declare incorrect choice. Therefore, herding will lead 
undesirable results of social learning [2]. 
 
As effects of herding decreases, accuracy of social learning will definitely increase. 
 
2.4 Human subjects to test Bayesian optimal theories of behavior 
There are lots of studies about human subjects and Bayesian theories. For example, [8] utilizes 
human subjects to identify prior probabilities when it comes to decision making tasks of humans 
and this paper also studied human ability to perceive prior probabilities. In simple perceptual 
organization, to identify the role of sensory uncertainty, [11] also used human subjects to test 
whether they perform optimal Bayesian inference. It includes the experiment that they ask 8 
participants to judge whether 2-line segments partially occluded belonged to the same line to 
show the importance of sensory uncertainty of decision making. What’s more, [4] let observers 
perform the embedded category task and non-parametrically estimates each observer’s category 
decision boundary to identify difference between Bayesian model and other fixed models. Ball 
game in [8], as well, applies internet users on mechanical turk to answer questions and collect 
data to verify their theories of behavior.  
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3. Experimental design 
 
3.1 Main design of experiment 
 
To verify the selfish learning, we are conducting an experiment by setting games rules and ask 
answers from workers in Amazon MTurk. We designed and elaborated the experiment by 
following experimenting methods used in research with team decision making [5, 6]. This 
experiment is a ball game with special rules. We set three different scoring rules: one with equal 
payment if final worker gets right answer, one with smoothly decreasing payment if final worker 
get right answer, and one with significantly decreasing payment if final worker get right answer. 
Suppose there are two boxes filling with balls of two different color that we can draw balls from 
them, and each worker can only know previous workers’ answers. We ask them to answer that if 
they know previous workers’ answer, how many numbers of balls of each color they see (if they 
draw nine balls from box) will make them choose which box they are drawing. After publishing 
this survey on MTurk, we can do experimental analysis to verify whether selfish learning is 
correct and where it is needed to be modified. 
 
3.2 Mathematical theory of expected answer from workers 
 
From our survey question, we set three workers to answer the ball questions. We need to acquire 
expected answers from workers to determine whether the collected data is in the range.  
There are two boxes A and B. A has 70 red balls and 30 blue balls; B has 70 blue balls and 30 
red balls. Drawing from one of the boxes randomly means that each box will have probability of 
1/2 to be drawn. Hereinafter, set random variable X to represent box drawing, and represent 
boxes as A (70,30) and B (30,70). 
 
Therefore, P (X = A) = P (X = B) = 1/2. 
 
From the box which is randomly drawn, we draw total 9 balls from that box. Suppose that there 
are r red balls and b blue balls, the probability will be: 
P(r, b | X = A) = PA(𝑟𝑟, 𝑏𝑏) = �70𝑟𝑟 ��30𝑏𝑏 ��1009 �  
P(r, b | X = B) = PB(𝑟𝑟, 𝑏𝑏) =  �70𝑏𝑏 ��30𝑟𝑟 ��1009 �  
which means the probability that we get r red balls and b blues balls from 9 balls drawn from 
random one box.  
 
Now we can do likelihood ratio test to find the proper value of b. 
L(r, b) = PA x P(r,b | X = A)
�1− PA) x P(r,b |X = B� = (
1
2
)�70𝑟𝑟 ��30𝑏𝑏 �
�1009 �(1−1
2
)�70𝑏𝑏 ��30𝑟𝑟 �
�1009 �
 = �
70
𝑟𝑟 ��
30
𝑏𝑏 �
�70𝑏𝑏 ��
30
𝑟𝑟 �
 
If r > b, L(r, b) will be greater than 1 and if b > r, L(r, b) will be smaller than 1. Therefore, b = 
4.5 (which is at the middle) is the most proper value. 
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After we get the expected value of b which is 4.5, we can infer value of a and c. In order to find 
the expected value which we define as T1 of the first worker, we should find the probability that 
the random box is box A (or box B) under the condition that there are r red balls and b blue balls 
in 9 balls.  
 
Use box A to extend. If the random box is box A:  T1 = 10 P(X = A | r, b) + 0 (1 - P(X = A | r, b)) = 10 P(X = A | r, b) 
With expectation value, we can find optimal r and b. 
 
By posterior probability: 
P(X = A | r, b) = PA x PA(𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏)
𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟,𝑏𝑏)  
We already know the value of PA(𝑟𝑟, 𝑏𝑏), and PA, so now we need to find P(r, b).  
P(r, b) = P(X = A) P(r, b | X = A) + P(X = B) P(r, b | X = B) which we already calculate.  
Combined with above formula, we can find optimal value of a and b. And we have expected 
value of a, b and c in the game.  
 
This game is designed to verify the selfish theory. We define the problem that there are two 
choices, so the answer Hn from workers will belong to {0,1}. But there is Gaussian noise that the 
final answer from workers will be Yn = Hn + 𝑍𝑍 ~(0,1), where Yn is observation and Hn is real 
answer. And we need to get what exact choice Hn  is from Yn.  
 
Based on that, we have three thresholds in this problem: the first value a which the worker 
decides to stop and choose the answer as 0, the second value c which the worker decided to stop 
and choose the answer as 1, the third value b that from a to b the worker chooses 0 and passes, 
and from b to c the worker chooses 1 and passes. Only when the final answer is correct, workers 
answer this question will get rewards. So we design the ball game with this problem. 
 
However, in this problem, we do the opposite. We need to know Hn  from Yn. But in the ball 
game, we tell workers others’ choice and ask them to answer Yn. And after we collect data of Yn, 
we can analyze data to see if they are consistent of what we calculate from expectation, the value 
that we calculate before using likelihood ratios test and posterior inference.  
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3.3 Progress on Mturk implementation 
 
On MTurk, we have already done the survey design with HTML and Javascript. Below is the 
ball game which will be published on MTurk. 
 
Imagine you are in a game show. You are one of 3 contestants in the game. At each round, the 
contestants are ordered at random. There are two boxes labelled A and B. Box A has 70 blue 
balls and 30 red balls, and Box B has 30 blue balls and 70 red balls. There are 9 balls drawn from 
one of two boxes (but you do not know exactly which box is). The sequence of color for these 9 
balls is invisible. Now, you need to decide which box these 9 balls belong to. You are the third 
one to guess the answer.  
 
The host chooses one of the two boxes at random without revealing the identity to the 
contestants. The contestants are called up in the chosen order and are allowed to draw 9 balls 
from the box. The contestant can observe the balls and has to return them to the box. Then, the 
contestant has to declare what he thinks is the identity of the box aloud, and has the option to 
stop or to pass to the next contestant in the chain. The next contestant repeats the same process. 
Each contestant is aware of the answers declared by his predecessors. 
 
Below is the rule to win: 
1. If the first contestant stops and declares the correct answer, then he gets 10 points.  
2. If the first contestant passes and the second contestant declared the correct answer and stops, 
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then both the first two contestants receive 9 points each.  
3. If second contestant chooses to pass and the third contestant declares the correct answer, then 
each of the three contestants receive 8 points.  
4. If the wrong answer is declared, no one receives any point.  
NOTE: only contestants who answer in the game receive a reward.  
  
Based on rules, you should answer the listed questions. All answers should be in range of 0-10 
balls by following rules: 
1. The first number, labeled by ‘a’, should be the maximum number of red balls that you see so 
that you will declare Box A and choose to stop this question. If you choose a = 0, it means that 
you will definitely choose box A and stop no matter what sequence of balls you see.  
2. The second number, labeled by ‘b’, should be the minimum number of red balls you see so 
that you will declare Box B and choose to stop this question. If you choose b = 10, it means 
that you will definitely choose box B and stop no matter what sequence of balls you see. 
3. The third number, labeled by ‘c’, is the threshold that you give an answer and decide to pass 
to next person. Specifically, if the number of red balls is in range of ‘a’ to ‘c’, you will declare 
Box A and pass to next one. If the number of red balls is in range of ‘c’ to ‘b’, you will declare 
Box B and pass to next one. 
 
Here is the example of the game: 
Nancy flipped the coin to choose a box (Box A or Box B) and let two contestants: Alex, Ben and 
Claire, play this game. Nancy firstly give this box to Alex and Alex drew 9 balls from that box 
without knowing which box it is. After seeing color of these 9 balls, Alex guessed that this box 
should be box A.  
 
Alex is not so confident about his answer, so he decided to pass to Ben and only tell Ben that he 
thought it should be box A. And then Nancy ask Ben which box it is. Ben does not know what 
Alex has seen, but only knows that Alex thought it should be box A.  
Now suppose you are Ben, depending on the answer from Alex, what is the largest number of 
red balls you see from that box will make you choose box A (number a) and choose to stop (not 
pass to Claire)? What is the smallest number of red balls you see from that box will make you 
choose box B (number c) and not pass to Claire?  
 
Between number a and number c, you are not confident about which box it is, so you need to 
declare an answer, pass to Claire and tell your guess to Claire. At that time, what is the number 
of red balls --- number b, that you will choose box A if number of red balls is between a and b, or 
you will choose box B if number of blue balls is between b and c? 
Note: you can only know the answer of previous contestants and you cannot know the color of 9 
balls that previous contestants saw. 
 
And then we ask the answer of different cases to collect data.  
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3.4 Sample size 
 
3.4.1 Simulation to get sample size 
 
We use Monte Carlo simulation to mimic worker behaviors and find proper size of the crowd. 
Monte Carlo simulation is a way to randomly simulate different cases and tackle those random 
samples to get final results we want. It can give us prediction of uncertainty and risk. It works by 
randomly choosing values for each task based on given parameters (the number we calculate and 
predict). After setting a chosen sample size n, it randomly generates n tasks and we can calculate 
average value of these n tasks. This is one-time simulation that we find an average value from n-
time random generating. Monte Carlo simulation do hundreds of thousands of this step to 
simulate a huge number of results based on random values. Calculating the percentage of results 
out of range in total final results will tell us the error percentage and we can modify the 
parameters we set to see when the error percentage satisfies our requirement. 
 
Here, we use Gaussian distribution to get random cases. By using python, the program generates 
a group of samples using three variables: the predicted sample size we set, the allowed error 
range and the correct answer we calculate. Firstly, it generates same samples with size of sample 
size we set, and then it will generate random Gaussian number and add them to those samples. 
So it will have n (sample size we set) different samples which have already been added with 
Gaussian random number. Secondly, calculating sum of those samples and getting average is a 
step to get one result of simulation. Repeating this simulation by one thousand times, we will 
have one thousand results of average of each simulation. So now, we have a Gaussian 
distribution of those average results, and then we can adjust the sample size we set to see which 
number will make the results fall into allowed error range. If it is, we can get final result of 
sample size.  
 
Below is the pseudo code of simulation: 
 Assume there is a pre-set sample size and correct answers of 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛. 
 
 Create a Final result array 
 
Generate sample array with pre-set sample size, each element is list of correct 
answer (𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛, 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛) 
 
For i in range (1000): 
 For i in range(sample size):  
 
// get different samples 
 
Modified simulated signals based on correct answers 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 by 
adding noise to randomly created samples. There will be new 
sample array with noise. 
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   // get the average values of those signals 
   Average value = sum of sample array/sample size 
   // add them to final result 
   Add average value of final result array 
Check whether the final Gaussian distribution falls in allowed error range 
 
The above pseudo code is one-time simulation of stable sample size. After this simulation, we 
will have an average value from randomization. This average value is what we want. And then 
we append this average value to final result array. After 1000-time simulation, there will be an 
array with 1000 average values.  
 
With this final result array: 
 
 Float epsilon; 
// Set epsilon value which is the range of error we allow. We only consider the average 
value which falls in range. 
 int count; 
 // count the frequency of signals which are out of error range we set 
 For i in range(size of final result array): 
  if final result array[i] out of range [correct answer–epsilon, correct answer 
+epsilon] 
   count++; 
 return count/size of final result array 
 
Hence, we can get probability of error with sample size we set. We can input any value of 
sample size and correct answer to see how probability of error varies. By outputting all 
probability of error, we can compare the statistics and find the most proper one. After adjusting 
pre-set sample size and error range, we can get the most suitable sample size to do the 
experiments. 
 
3.4.2 Results of simulations  
 
To simulate, we choose a = 5.5, b = 7.5 and c = 8.5 and epsilon = 0.1 to see the results. This 
MCMC is for one extreme case of answers for alpha, beta, gamma. The reason I chose this 
particular one was because the workers are fairly certain of the hypothesis before making their 
observation. That is why the thresholds are biased toward high values. In such an instance, the 
workers should necessarily be able to function well. Contextually it is one of the easier cases and 
hence we can utilize this check (sanity check). 
 
At the same time, because the thresholds are close to the extreme, the chance of making errors is 
also more pronounced because of the quantization. For example, as graph attached below, line of 
variable c is higher than other two lines. This is because the answers can at most be 9.5, and the 
correct answer is 8.5. So most large errors are quantized sharply to lie within the range whereas 
that's not the case necessarily with the negative errors. That means we implicitly induce a bias in 
the worker responses and so the probability with which they are wrong is also more. 
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After choosing these four values of variables, we run MCMC simulation. In order to see results 
directly, we set x-axis as sample size we tried and y-axis as percentage or error for each variable 
after simulation by matching sample size. From example, (10,0.77) for blue line means that when 
we choose 10 as sample size, after we simulate MCMC by hundreds of thousands of times and 
calculate average percentage error, we got 77% error percentage for value of variable a. 
 
Here is the graph we initially got: 
 
Figure 2. sample size with matching percentage of error (incorrect version) 
 
This graph is not the graph we expected. At the beginning, three lines increase fast and begin to 
decrease about sample size = 10. What’s more, percentage error of c decreases most smoothly 
but begins to increase firstly. Percentage value of b become stable and c keep decreasing. This is 
not we expect to see. Percentage of error should be decreased as number of sample size 
increases.  
 
After analyzing, it is an effect of the quantization and significantly low epsilon value in 
comparison to the noise level. Since the levels are separated by 1, it suffices to use an epsilon of 
0.5 on the average responses of the crowd. 
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Additionally, it also seems like there is some mistake with the average values computed for a,b,c 
as the values seem to be outside the range.  
 
For a bit more rigor in the estimates from MCMC, in place of computing the mean of the (noisy 
and quantized) responses, we use the median of the responses instead of means of the responses. 
In general, the median is a little more robust in the presence of such non-linear operations (like 
quantization).  
 
Therefore, after seeing results under condition {a = 5.5, b = 7.5, c = 8.5, epsilon = 0.1}, we 
modify the code by adjusting epsilon to 0.5 and change calculating average values of each 
variable as results for each time of simulation to calculating medians of each variable.  
 
Here is resulted graph after modifying original code: 
 
 
 
Figure 3. sample size with matching percentage of error (correct version) 
 
 
To check, we discover that in histogram, values for each variable are accurate: 
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Figure 4. histogram of frequency for each a, b and c value 
 
(x-axis is simulated value of the worker and y-axis is the frequency of that value) 
 
 
The final result works. In practice, we would use this error graph as a benchmark, and set an 
error level, say 10%, and identify the number of samples to be obtained for this. This can also be 
used the other way around in that, given the statistics of the responses and the error probabilities 
of the workers, we can do some post-processing to the data to correct for such errors. 
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4. Simulation of infinite horizon 
4.1 Mathematical basis 
 
Agents respond in order to maximize rewards, and the reward is dependent on below functions: public signal: 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 = Ρ [ 𝐻𝐻∗ = 0 | 𝐻𝐻�𝑛𝑛−1 = ℎ𝑛𝑛−1, ?̂?𝑆𝑛𝑛+1 = 0 ] which is action set we choose Threshold: 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 =  12 + log ( 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) 
Variables: 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 = 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 − �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔 � 𝑅𝑅1(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 )1 − 𝑅𝑅0(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 )��+
𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 = 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 + �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔 � 𝑅𝑅0(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )1 − 𝑅𝑅1(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )��+ coefficient: 𝜌𝜌 ∈ (12 , 1) 
𝑃𝑃0 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾)], 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞′1 − 𝑞𝑞′ =  𝑞𝑞1 − 𝑞𝑞 𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾)]𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾)]
𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛾𝛾,𝛽𝛽)], 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞′1 − 𝑞𝑞′ =  𝑞𝑞1 − 𝑞𝑞 𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛾𝛾,𝛽𝛽)]𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛾𝛾,𝛽𝛽)]
𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌 ∉ (𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽)], 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞′ = ∅
 
Cost function: 𝐶𝐶(ℎ) =  �𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌 ≤  𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛], 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ℎ = 0
𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌 ≥  𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛], 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ℎ = 1 
By the above variables and coefficients: 
𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) =  𝐶𝐶(ℎ) +  𝜌𝜌𝑃𝑃ℎ[𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 ∈ (𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛, 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛)]𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 ) +  𝜌𝜌𝑃𝑃ℎ[𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 ∈ (𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛)]𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 ) 
Here, we need to find 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 and 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+1 to maximize reward to see whether it acts as expected when 
in infinite horizon. 
 
Reinforcement learning implies that workers can learn optimal function by playing the game a 
few times and observing rewards they get. By this simulation, we can ideally get the numerical 
characterization of optimal worker behavior (i.e. how should workers behave).  
4.2 Realization of mathematical part 
 
4.2.1 reinforcement learning with fixed number of states 
 
We utilize Lagrange multipliers and constrained optimization to optimize rewards with those 
constraints and get matching actions responding to maximized rewards.  
 
In Lagrange multipliers and constrained optimization, there are two functions f and g, and there 
must be a point that g touches with f.  This point is the optimal point we want to find. 
𝐿𝐿(𝑥𝑥, 𝜆𝜆) =  ∆𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) +  𝜆𝜆∆𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥) = 0 
Where f is the reward function, and g is the constraint function. 
Because 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛ℎ = P (h = 0) ∈ [0,1], we divide it to 9 parts:  
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𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛
ℎ ∈ (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9), 
For each 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛0 and 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛1, we use Lagrange Multiplier to find the best 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11  and the maximized 
matching rewards.  
 
Here is pseudo code of reinforcement learning code: 
𝐶𝐶(ℎ) =  �𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌 ≤  𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛], if ℎ = 0
𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌 ≥  𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛], if ℎ = 1 
 f(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,,𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 ,𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 ) = -(𝐶𝐶(ℎ) +  𝜌𝜌𝑃𝑃ℎ[𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 ∈ (𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛, 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛)]𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 ) +  𝜌𝜌𝑃𝑃ℎ[𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 ∈(𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛)]𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )) 
 constraints :=  
[𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 − 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 + �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔 � 𝑅𝑅1�𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 �1−𝑅𝑅0�𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 ���+ = 0, 
𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 − 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 − �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔 �
𝑅𝑅0(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )1 − 𝑅𝑅1(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )��+ = 0,                      𝑞𝑞′1 − 𝑞𝑞′ −  𝑞𝑞1 − 𝑞𝑞 𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾)]𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾)] = 0, 
𝑞𝑞′
1−𝑞𝑞′
−
𝑞𝑞
1−𝑞𝑞
𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌∈(𝛾𝛾,𝛽𝛽)]
𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌∈(𝛾𝛾,𝛽𝛽)] = 0] 
           So, we have constraint function:                                         𝑔𝑔1(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )   = [𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛 − 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 + �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔 � 𝑅𝑅1�𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 �1−𝑅𝑅0�𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 ���+,        𝑔𝑔2(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )  =  𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 − 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 − �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔 � 𝑅𝑅0(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )1 − 𝑅𝑅1(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )��+, 
𝑔𝑔3(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )  =  𝑞𝑞′1 − 𝑞𝑞′ −  𝑞𝑞1 − 𝑞𝑞 𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾)]𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾)],     𝑔𝑔4(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )  =  𝑞𝑞′1 − 𝑞𝑞′ − 𝑞𝑞1 − 𝑞𝑞 𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛾𝛾,𝛽𝛽)]𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌 ∈ (𝛾𝛾,𝛽𝛽)] 
 L(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 , 𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆2, 𝜆𝜆3, 𝜆𝜆4) = ∆f(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 ) + 𝜆𝜆1∆𝑔𝑔1(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 )    
  +𝜆𝜆2∆𝑔𝑔2�𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,,𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 ,𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 � + 𝜆𝜆3∆𝑔𝑔3�𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 � + 
𝜆𝜆4∆𝑔𝑔4(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 ) 
 For each 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛0: 
Solve L(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 , 𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆2, 𝜆𝜆3, 𝜆𝜆4) to find optimal �𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 � 
 For each  𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛1: 
Solve L(𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 , 𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆2, 𝜆𝜆3, 𝜆𝜆4) to find optimal �𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 � 
After we get the matching optimal next-action set and optimal rewards, we update reward 
matrix and repeat optimization again. After the 
�𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 � and f�𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 �  are converged, we get the final optima 
results. 
And we can finally get best 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11  , 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛, and the maximized matching rewards of 
each pair of 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛0 and 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛1. It will give us clearer understanding of what is the correct selfish 
behavior, and obtain further insights on how to work with workers who are selfish 
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4.2.2 results of reinforcement learning (not as expected) 
 
After we run the reinforcement learning code for huge number of iterations, results look weird 
(all lines of rewards and 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,, 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 are not stable): 
 
Reward graphs after running the code, which is obviously unstable: 
(blue line is reward when h = 0 and orange line is reward when h = 1) 
 
Figure 5. reward of h = 0 and h = 1 versus value of 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 
 
 
 
𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 ℎ = 0, which is obviously unstable:  
 
18 
 
Figure 6. 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 vs. value of 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 0 
 
 
𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 ℎ = 1:  
 
 
Figure 7. 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 vs. value of 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 1 
 
Matching next state, which fluctuates dramatically and shows nothing: 
(blue line is next state for h = 0 and orange line is next state for h = 1) 
 
Figure 8. 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+1 vs. 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 
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4.2.3 Q-learning 
 
In reinforcement learning, we use fixed state 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛ℎ ∈ (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9) with h 
= 0 and h = 1 to find best next state with max reward. This learning exploit fixed number of 
combinations and find the best one. After analyzing the graph and the code, we think that the 
unstable results are from some tricky numerical calculation in optimization. 
  
To avoid unstable results from previous section, we change reinforcement learning to Q-learning 
by exploring Q table to avoid optimizing steps with fixed number of states.  
 
We set ranges of available values of 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 and make them as action sets matching with each 
state.  
 
After firstly initializing 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛  with random values and setting q = 12, we use function 𝑞𝑞′1−𝑞𝑞′ = 𝑞𝑞
1−𝑞𝑞
𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌∈(𝛼𝛼,𝛾𝛾)]
𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌∈(𝛼𝛼,𝛾𝛾)] and 𝑞𝑞′1−𝑞𝑞′ − 𝑞𝑞1−𝑞𝑞 𝑃𝑃0[𝑌𝑌∈(𝛾𝛾,𝛽𝛽)]𝑃𝑃1[𝑌𝑌∈(𝛾𝛾,𝛽𝛽)] to calculate 𝑞𝑞′(next state) and use calculated 𝑞𝑞′ to get 
matching reward value with function  
𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) =  𝐶𝐶(ℎ) +  𝜌𝜌𝑃𝑃ℎ[𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 ∈ (𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛, 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛)]𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 ) +  𝜌𝜌𝑃𝑃ℎ[𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 ∈ (𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛)]𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 ) 
The reward value is what we need to fill in Q table and we get 𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+10 )  and 𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+11 ) from Q 
table when we calculate current reward value. Q table is initially filled with random values and 
then updated with process of Q-learning.  
 
After running a certain amount of iterations, we get a fully updated Q-table and can know best 
reward and action for each state. 
 
4.2.4 Results of Q-learning (expected) 
Here is reward values when 𝜌𝜌 = 0.55 (h = 0), 𝜌𝜌 is non-increasing payment for worker. As we can 
see, the reward is increasing with value of 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 
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Figure 9. reward vs. 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 0, 𝜌𝜌 = 0.55 
Below is reward values for 𝜌𝜌 = 0.80 (h = 0). Compared with figure 9, the line looks smoother. 
 
 
Figure 10. reward vs. 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 0, 𝜌𝜌 = 0.80 
Reward values for  𝜌𝜌 = 0.95 (h = 0): 
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Figure 11. reward vs. 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 0, 𝜌𝜌 = 0.95 
Best actions (three threshold) for 𝜌𝜌 = 0.80 (h = 0): 
 
Figure 12. 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 vs. value of 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 0 
 
Reward values for 𝜌𝜌 = 0.99 (h = 1): 
22 
 
 
Figure 13. reward vs. 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 1, 𝜌𝜌 = 0.99 
 
Best actions (three threshold) for 𝜌𝜌 = 0.99 (h = 1): 
 
Figure 14.𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 vs. value of 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 0 
Final reward graph for h = 0: 
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Figure 15. Final reward vs. 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 0 
Final reward graph for h = 1: 
 
Figure 16. Final reward vs. 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 1 
After getting two Q-tables of h = 0 and h = 1, we combine two Q-tables to one with function: 
Q-table = 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛0 * 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒ℎ=0 + (1-𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛1) * 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒ℎ=1 
The new Q-table stored matching average reward values of each state corresponding to each 
action (thresholds) 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛. By finding optimal reward for each state and running a certain 
amount of iterations, we can get optimal action graph: 
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Figure 17. Final 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 vs. value of 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 0 
Now we are confirmed that the simulation is correct. So, we ran more iterations on workspace to 
get elaborated graph. 
Reward graph when h = 0 with three different payoff values: 
 
Figure 18. Final reward vs. 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 0 with different value of 𝜌𝜌 
Reward graph when h = 1 with three different payoff values: 
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Figure 19. Final reward vs. 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 0 with different value of 𝜌𝜌 
Average payoff comparison (average of two rewards): 
 
Figure 20. Average final reward vs. 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 for h = 0 and h = 1 with different value of 𝜌𝜌 
Threshold comparison: 
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Figure 21. Final 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 vs. value of 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 when h = 0 with different value of 𝜌𝜌 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The graphs we get from Monte Carlo simulation and Q-learning can give us three thresholds 
𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛in different situations (different 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) and sample size in Mturk experiment by setting 
three thresholds and 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛. 
 
When we do Q-learning, we have different states 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 and fix 𝜌𝜌 which represents non-increasing 
payment rate for each worker. If one worker chooses to declare and pass to next worker, payment 
will be decreased. It means that with number of answered workers increasing, payment for each 
worker will be reduced and will be zero if answer if incorrect. Under this condition, it is 
intuitively that if passing to next worker will lead to significant decrease of payment, such as 0.9 
to 0.1, current worker will prefer to stop and declare because it is not worth of passing to next 
one. Oppositely, if payment just decreases slightly, it is safe for current worker to declare answer 
and pass question to next one. Therefore, as payment for each worker increases, the reward curve 
will be smoother at the end because each worker intents to get maximized reward. Current 
worker will prefer to pass to next one due to less risk and slightly different payment. The last 
half part of 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 represents bigger probability that h = 0. As workers prefer to pass to next one, the 
possibility to get big rewards will be increased, as figure 18 shows. 
 
Therefore, when h = 1, as possibility of h = 0 decreases, reward will be increased. So, reward 
graph of h = 1has opposite trend compared with reward graph of h = 0, as shown in figure 19. 
 
For three thresholds, as can be seen in the comparative thresholds plots (figure 21), if the payoff 
for the agents decays fast, then the thresholds for alpha and beta are close to gamma and go 
further away when rho increases. This is because, if the agents loose payoff fast upon passing, 
they prefer to stop more often instead. On the other hand, if the payoff does not decrease by 
much, then they prefer to pass and wait for the correct answer. Also, the alpha values converge to 
gamma when q_n is close to 1 and beta converges to gamma when 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 is close to 0. This is 
because, if the agent is confident that the truth is hypothesis 0 (𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛close to 1), then they are more 
willing to stop and declare 0, and so alpha is close to gamma. On the other hand, if they are 
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confident of it being a 1 (q_n close to 0), then they stop and declare 1, and so beta is close to 
gamma in this case. 
 
Next, the average payoff received by the agent is higher when 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛is close to 0 or 1 as the agent is 
fairly confident of the true hypothesis. It is the worst when 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛= 0.5 (perfect uncertainty about the 
true hypothesis). Also note that the average payoff is more when the rho values are larger as the 
agents are more willing to wait for the right answer and don't loose much money in this waiting 
period. 
 
To do the experiment to conduct whether human thinks the same as we expect in mathematical 
theories, we can calculate 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 in the ball game mentioned in section 3.3 and get matching 
𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛 from figure 17.  
 
After we get 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛,𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛, we have parameters we need in Mturk experiment. By using three 
thresholds to run the code with pre-set epsilon (percentage of error), we can get am image like 
figure 3. If we choose epsilon = 0.2, we find the situation that maximized epsilon for thresholds 
is 0.2 and then get matching sample size. 
 
Therefore, we get three thresholds from Q-learning and get sample size from three thresholds. 
With those parameters, we can publish survey on Turk to get response. Setting matching 
thresholds for exact state as correct number, if answers from workers are close enough to these 
thresholds, workers can get bonus, otherwise not. And thus, we can conduct the experiment and 
to check whether human acts as what we think. 
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